Zelcore

b14g CORE Staking Exploit: What Holders Need to Check

5 min read
Illustration of the b14g CORE staking exploit showing separate CORE and BTC staking positions

An attacker withdrew 97,045,563 CORE from 91 b14g staking orders in one transaction on 31 October, Bitquery’s on-chain investigation found. As of 2 November 2026, the latest status in the supplied reports is that b14g paused the affected contracts and said BTC staked through its protocol was unaffected, TokenPost reported. You do not need to move or migrate CORE held in Zelcore because of this incident; if you deposited CORE through b14g, follow its recovery updates.

The October 31 drain of about 97 million CORE from b14g

The withdrawal happened at 09:29:51 UTC on 31 October and was worth about $1.47 million at the time, Bitquery calculated. The large number in the headline is a count of CORE tokens, not a dollar figure. Coindaro reported that b14g described the withdrawal from its contracts as unauthorized.

The response came after some of the CORE had already moved. Bitquery measured 66 minutes between the drain and the contract pause; during that interval, 23.4 million CORE left the wallet that received the withdrawal through new addresses, its investigation says. Pausing the affected contracts limits further activity there. It does not, by itself, return CORE that has already left a staking order. For related reading on a halted network, see Fogo Mainnet Halt: What the 400 Million FOGO Compromise Means.

For a holder, the dividing line is where the CORE was before the attack. A CORE balance you kept in Zelcore is different from CORE you deposited into a b14g staking order. Check that distinction before deciding whether a recovery announcement applies to you.

How zero-value requests withdrew CORE from b14g staking orders

The attacker submitted 99 withdrawal requests in that single transaction, each asking for zero CORE, Bitquery found. Core’s staking code interpreted zero as a request for the entire stake, so the targeted orders paid out in full. The 99 requests and 91 orders describe different parts of the same transaction; they are not a count of affected people.

That detail matters because “zero withdrawal” can sound as though no tokens should have moved. In the behavior Bitquery documented, zero was the instruction that caused a full payout. The requests came from the attacker’s wallet, not from a holder deciding to withdraw their own CORE.

Bitquery also traced the wallet’s funding and later transfers: a service it called “service Y” sent the wallet 615.62 CORE for fees before the drain, then later routed 11.0 million of the stolen CORE to MEXC, its investigation says. Those transfers help trace the incident; they do not identify which individual depositors will recover funds.

What is confirmed about the CORE drain and what remains unclear

At the time of Bitquery’s 31 October report, 68.15 million of the withdrawn CORE had not moved: 63.65 million sat in the attacker’s second wallet and 4.5 million in two new wallets, its on-chain account says. “Not moved” describes the location of those tokens at that point. It does not mean they had been returned to b14g staking positions.

B14g said exchange partners had frozen about 9 million CORE, Coindaro reported. A reported exchange freeze is separate from the on-chain balance that Bitquery observed. Holders should wait for a recovery update before treating either figure as an amount available to repay deposits.

B14g also said BTC staked through its protocol was unaffected, TokenPost reported. Bitquery explicitly said it had not checked the Bitcoin side of that claim, its investigation notes. The statement is relevant to BTC stakers, but it is a project statement rather than a finding from Bitquery’s CORE transaction tracing.

The number of affected users, any compensation, the exchanges behind the reported freeze, and whether the contracts will reopen remained unresolved in Coindaro’s report. Ninety-one drained orders therefore should not be read as 91 affected users. For another staking incident where the asset and position matter to the reader’s next step, see our MetaMask staking incident guide.

What this means for you if you deposited CORE through b14g

These steps address different holdings. The reported withdrawal concerned CORE in b14g staking orders; b14g’s statement about staked BTC concerns another asset in the protocol. Neither statement calls for a blanket wallet migration. Our Liquid Network exploit explainer is related reading on why a pause and an asset’s recovery status are separate questions.

How to check whether your b14g deposit was CORE or staked BTC

Start with the asset you deposited through b14g. If it was CORE, compare your deposit records with the CORE you still hold in Zelcore and follow updates about the affected CORE orders. If it was BTC, keep that position separate in your notes and follow b14g’s BTC updates. If you used both assets, check each position on its own terms.

Record the amount and date of any CORE you sent to b14g so you can recognize the position in a future recovery notice. Do not assume that an order count tells you how many people were affected, or that a token still sitting in an attacker wallet is already available to depositors. For organizing the assets you hold yourself, see Tracking Your Multi-Chain Portfolio in Zelcore.

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Further Reading

MetaMask staking incident illustrated with diverted validator rewards, an exiting Ethereum validator, and a separate ETH withdrawal key

MetaMask staking incident: why validators exited and what ETH stakers should check

Reported diversion of staking rewards prompted MetaMask to exit Ethereum validators. ETH stakers should check reward destinations, withdrawal credentials, and exit status as separate issues.

7 min read
Liquid Network exploit explained through a paused LBTC-to-Bitcoin peg-out bridge

Liquid Network Exploit Explained: Why LBTC Peg-Outs Paused

A reported $320 million Bitcoin withdrawal from Liquid’s federated peg has paused or restricted LBTC redemptions. Here is how Liquid peg-outs work, why the incident may not involve stolen private keys, and what counterparty risk means for self-custody users.

8 min read
Tracking Your Multi-Chain Portfolio in Zelcore

Tracking Your Multi-Chain Portfolio in Zelcore

Zelcore shows your holdings marked to market across 80+ chains — but it's not a P&L tool. Learn what the portfolio view does well, where it stops, and when to reach for a dedicated tracker.

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