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X100 governance takeover: What X holders need to know

5 min read
X100 governance exploit illustrated by two occupied council seats controlling a treasury vault and liquidity pool

As of 25 October 2026, the latest status established by the supplied reports is that the X100 attack was still under way in the October 24 updates, after attackers had realized about 4.85 million USDT, TSN reported. Those reports do not establish whether it has since ended. You do not need to move or migrate your X on the basis of this incident.

X100 governance takeover and the reported 4.85 million USDT extraction

X100 Global is a token project on Ethereum. The reported attack targeted its governance process, treasury tokens and project liquidity: attackers gained control of two seats in its three-member Senate and used that control to move assets, TokenPost reported.

Blockaid’s account describes one attacker selling 400,000 X from the treasury into an empty pool the attacker had created, as relayed by TSN. It then describes another attacker burning the Freezer’s Uniswap V3 liquidity positions, TSN reported. These actions involved project-controlled assets. The reports do not describe a required migration for people holding X in their own wallets.

The cited on-chain example was recorded as a successful Uniswap V3 swap at 14:11 UTC on October 24, TSN reported. That timestamp identifies an example transaction; it does not establish when the entire incident began or ended.

How two of X100’s three Senate seats enabled treasury and liquidity moves

X100’s governance model gives the Senate authority over where liquidity is held, and smart contracts carry out Senate decisions, TokenPost explained. Control of two seats therefore gave the attackers a way to direct a three-seat decision process. The key exposure for a holder is that governance authority can reach assets held by the project, including assets used to provide trading liquidity.

The treasury sale and the action against the Freezer affected different parts of that arrangement. One sent X from the treasury into a pool created by the attacker; the other acted on Uniswap V3 positions held by the Freezer, TokenPost reported. The pool’s being empty matters because the attacker chose the destination for a treasury sale. The Freezer matters because the governance process could also direct liquidity already held in a project contract.

The supplied reports establish that the attackers took the seats and used the Senate route. They do not establish precisely how the seats were obtained. For a separate example of voting power affecting project funds, read Term Finance Governance Exploit: How Voting Power Drained $8.5 Million.

What the October 24 X100 reports establish and what remains uncertain

The reported 4.85 million USDT was realized across two transactions, while a later update described roughly 550,000 X extracted across three transactions and about 12.2 million X still in the Freezer, TSN reported. USDT and X are separate assets here. The X figure should not be presented as additional USDT proceeds, and the Freezer balance was a snapshot rather than a final accounting.

The third cited transaction succeeded at 14:40 UTC and was recorded as removing 549,999.4 X and 30.69 USDT of Uniswap V3 liquidity, TSN reported. This transaction detail is more precise than the rounded X figure in the update, but it does not settle the incident’s final cost.

ChainCatcher relayed a Blockaid alert that still described the attack as ongoing at 22:49 on October 24. The extracts do not provide a confirmed resolution, a final total or a completed account of any response by X100. Treat the figures as what had been reported at the stated times, not as a final loss figure for every affected asset.

What this means for you if you hold governance-controlled tokens like X

The reported route ran through X100’s governance and project assets. It gives you a reason to assess control over the token’s treasury and liquidity before making a trading decision; it does not create a wallet migration step.

The incident also concerned USDT held or realized through X100’s asset movements, rather than an instruction for everyone holding USDT to move it. For more on differing forms of USDT exposure, see USDT, Offshore: Same Ticker, Three Different Trust Models on Tron, Ethereum, and TON. You can also read Can Tether freeze USDT in a self-custody wallet?.

How to check your exposure to X100’s treasury and Freezer liquidity

Start with what you actually hold. If you hold X, your immediate exposure is to the token and the trading liquidity available for it. If you hold only USDT in your own wallet, the reported figure describes assets realized by the attackers from X100’s treasury and liquidity activity; it is not a report that your wallet’s USDT was taken.

Next, separate the project’s asset locations. The account of the attack identifies treasury X, a pool created for the treasury sale and Uniswap V3 positions held by the Freezer, TokenPost reported. Ask which of those locations supports any swap you are considering. A balance in the Freezer and liquidity available for your trade are not interchangeable measures.

Finally, check the authority behind those locations. The practical questions are how many people or seats can approve a move, what assets those decisions reach, and whether a decision can affect the pool you expect to use. The X100 reports show why those questions belong alongside a wallet balance when assessing a governance-controlled token. For other reports centered on liquidity exposure, read Chainflip TRON USDT Exploit: What LPs and Wallet Users Should Know and the Moonwell MAMO report.

Sources

Other sources


Further Reading

Term Finance governance exploit diagram showing drained voting power, a seven-day timelock, and redirected protocol funds

Term Finance Governance Exploit: How Voting Power Drained $8.5 Million

The Term Finance governance exploit reportedly redirected an estimated $8.5 million after attackers gained enough voting power to pass malicious proposals. The incident shows why a timelock is only useful when participants monitor and act during its delay period.

9 min read
USDT, Offshore: Same Ticker, Three Different Trust Models on Tron, Ethereum, and TON

USDT, Offshore: Same Ticker, Three Different Trust Models on Tron, Ethereum, and TON

USDT runs on Tron, Ethereum, TON and Solana with the same ticker but four different fee structures, freeze regimes and trust assumptions. Here is what changes per chain.

8 min read
Wallet owner asks: can Tether freeze USDT? An issuer-controlled contract gate blocks token transfers while the owner holds the key.

Can Tether freeze USDT in a self-custody wallet?

Tether can restrict transfers of its USDT on supported networks even when you control your wallet keys. A September 28 Senate report and Tether’s response bring that distinction into focus.

7 min read

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